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INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL AND SHORT-TERM
SENTENCES IN PENNSYLVANIA:
A CLAIM IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY
by THOMAS M. PLACE*
Many... abiding constitutional problems are encountered.., in the
context of prosecutions for minor offenses which carry only short
sentences. We do not believe that the Constitution contemplates that
people deprived of constitutional rights at this level be left
remediless .... I
INTRODUCTION
To protect the fundamental right to a fair trial, every defendant, without regard
to the length of imprisonment imposed, is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel.2 Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Grant,' the rule in Pennsylvania was that a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
was reviewable on direct appeal. 4 The general rule was that the claim was waived
unless raised by new counsel at the first opportunity, even if that first opportunity
was direct appeal and the issue had not been presented by way of post-sentence
motion to the court below.5 Grant reversed this long-standing rule and held that
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel would no longer be considered on direct
appeal, but would be deferred to the post-conviction process governed by the
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act6 (PCRA).7
The PCRA provides a procedure for defendants to collaterally challenge their
conviction or sentence. The Act is the "sole means of obtaining collateral relief' 8
and has been broadly interpreted as creating a unified statutory framework for
reviewing claims that were traditionally cognizable in habeas corpus.9 The Act
. Professor of Law, the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. Special thanks
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1. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1968).
2. Commonwealth v. Cousin, 888 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. 2005).
3. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
4. Commonwealth v. Dancer, 331 A.2d 435, 437 (Pa. 1975), abrogated by Grant, 813 A.2d. at
726.
5. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687, 695 n.6 (Pa. 1977), overruled by Grant, 813 A.2d at
726. See, e.g., Dancer, 331 A.2d at 437-38 (holding that, because the issue of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel was not brought up on direct appeal, it cannot be brought up in Post Conviction Hearing Act
(PCHA) proceedings).
6. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9546 (2006).
7. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
8. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542.
9. Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250-51 (Pa. 1999), abrogated by Grant, 813 A.2d
authorizes relief when a conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the
Act's specifically enumerated errors or defects 0 and when the claimed error has not
been waived" or previously litigated on appeal or in a previous petition under the
Act. The Act provides a forum for a defendant to establish that counsel's acts or
omissions during trial or on direct appeal deprived him of his constitutionally
guaranteed right to effective counsel. 2 An important limitation on the availability
of post-conviction relief is the requirement that the defendant be in custody at the
time relief is granted under the Act. 3 In addition, the Act does not authorize a stay
of sentence while relief is being sought.In
Post-Grant, the Superior Court created an exception in cases where the
defendant was sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. 5 Noting that strict
application of Grant in such cases would preclude post-conviction review of claims
of trial counsel ineffectiveness because the sentence would be served before post-
conviction review was completed, the court held that claims of ineffectiveness in
such cases would be considered on direct appeal. 16 In Commonwealth v. O'Berg,"
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Superior Court's short sentence
exception to Grant, holding that the exception would undermine the reasons for
deferring ineffectiveness claims to collateral review and was too ambiguous for
lower courts to apply.' 8
As a result of Grant and O'Berg, unless the issue of trial counsel
ineffectiveness is preserved for appeal by new counsel in a post-sentence motion,
the more than fifteen percent of defendants who receive a sentence of one year or
less' 9 do not have a forum to present a claim that counsel's performance at trial
at 726; Commonwealth v. Ahlbom, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 1997).
10. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2).
11. Id. § 9543(a)(3). See also id. § 9544(b) (describing when an issue has been waived for purposes
of the statute).
12. Id. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). In Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1999), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the PCRA does not impose a higher burden on a defendant seeking post-
conviction relief than when ineffectiveness is considered on direct appeal. Id. at 332. The court
interpreted § 9543(a)(2)(i) of the Act as embodying the prejudice element of the Sixth Amendment
standard for ineffectiveness claims set out in Strickland v. Washington. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
668 (1984)). The Act has been interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to apply where the
defendant establishes ineffectiveness of counsel on discretionary appeal and in the representation of the
defendant in a petition under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that in neither proceeding is the defendant
entitled to counsel as a matter of state or federal constitutional law. See Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825
A.2d 630, 633-34 (Pa. 2003) (holding that petitioner had a rule-based right to counsel during direct
appeal under criminal procedure rules, such that lack of a federal right to counsel on discretionary
appeal did not preclude post-conviction relief based on ineffective counsel); Commonwealth v.
Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699 (Pa. 1998) ("[Wle have never found our power to review, and if necessary,
remedy the deficiencies of counsel at the post-conviction stage circumscribed by the parameters of the
Sixth Amendment.").
13. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
14. Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.2d 914, 916 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
15. Id. at916.
16. Commonwealth v. Blessitt, 852 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Commonwealth v.
Ingold, 823 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Salisbury, 823 A.2d at 916.
17. 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
18. Id. at 600.
19. E-mail from Joan Lisle, Field Services Manager, Pa. Comm'n on Sentencing, to Thomas M.
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deprived them of their constitutionally guaranteed right to effective counsel. 20 This
Article begins with a discussion of the federal and Pennsylvania constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel and then examines the case law of waiver of
claims of ineffectiveness prior to Grant. The article next discusses the Grant and
O'Berg decisions deferring ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction process
and concludes with an examination of solutions to provide defendants who receive
short sentences a remedy to challenge the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
I. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
To protect the fundamental right to a fair trial, a defendant is entitled to
effective assistance of counsel. The constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v.
Alabama.21 In Powell, the Court stated that, when due process requires the state to
provide counsel to an indigent defendant, "that duty is not discharged by an
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. '22 Later, in Glasser v. United
States,23 the Court held that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was
violated by judicial action that denied defendant's "right to have the effective
assistance of counsel. 24 Following the Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,
5
which extended the right to appointed counsel in state cases to indigent felony
defendants, 26 the Court in McMann v. Richardson27 stated that "[i]t has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. 2 8
Place, Professor of Law, Penn State Univ., Dickinson School of Law (June 29, 2007, 12:00 EST) (on
file with author).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. Id. at 71.
23. 315 U.S. 60 (1942), superseded by statute, FED. R. EvID. 104(a), as recognized in Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987), superseded by statute, FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2), as recognized
in United States v. Kemp, Criminal Action No. 04-370, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2072, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
10,2005).
24. Id. at 76.
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Id. at 341.
27. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). In McMann, the Court stated that, "if the fight to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.
.Id. at 771.
28. Id. at 771 n.14. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) ("[T]he right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."). In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984), the Court explained that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is grounded in
the language of the Sixth Amendment:
The special value of the right to the assistance of counsel explains why "[i]t has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel." ... The
text of the Sixth Amendment itself suggests as much. The Amendment requires not merely
the provision of counsel to the accused, but "Assistance," which is to be "for his defence."
Thus, "the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure "Assistance" at trial .... If
no actual "Assistance" "for" the accused's "defence" is provided, then the constitutional
guarantee has been violated.
Id. at 654 (quoting first from McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14, then from United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
Fall 2007]
In holding that the constitutional right to counsel on first appeal encompasses the
right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court in Evitts v. Lucey29 noted that "a
party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better
position than one who has no counsel at all."'30 Because the right to counsel applies
without regard to the length of the sentence imposed,31 as long as the defendant is
constitutionally entitled to counsel, whether counsel is retained or appointed,32 the
defendant is entitled to effective counsel.33
In Pennsylvania, the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and on
direct appeal is guaranteed by article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that "the fight to counsel is
meaningless if effective assistance is not guaranteed."35 Although the court has not
recognized a state constitutional right to counsel on discretionary appeal or in post-
conviction proceedings, it has held that, because defendants in both proceedings
have a rule-based right to counsel, that right includes the concomitant right to
effective assistance of counsel.3 6
300, 309 (1973)). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ("The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results.").
29. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
30. Id. at 396. A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when charged with a felony,
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344, and where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed for a less serious charge.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) ("[N]o indigent criminal defendant [can] be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in
his defense."); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (stating that defense counsel must be
appointed in any criminal prosecution however classified "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a
brief period .... "). See also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that a suspended
sentence may not be imposed unless defendant was provided counsel).
31. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33.
32. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) ("Since respondent had no
constitutional right to counsel [on discretionary appeal], he could not be deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel .... ").
34. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by
himself and his counsel .... ). See also Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999)
(concluding that right to counsel under Pennsylvania Constitution is "coterminous with the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for purposes of determining when the right attaches"). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has also held that the test for counsel ineffectiveness under the U.S. Constitution set out
in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, is coterminous with the three-part Pennsylvania test in Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987). Cousin, 888 A.2d at 715 n.6. See also Thomas M. Place, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 1389,
1392-93 (1996) (discussing the Pierce standard).
35. Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989).
36. Liebel, 825 A.2d at 634-35; Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 699-700.
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II. WAIVER AND REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS
A. Pre-Grant Case Law
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially considered the issue of waiver, and
appellate and post-conviction review of ineffectiveness claims, in Commonwealth
v. Dancer.37 Dancer appealed from a denial of relief under the Post Conviction
Hearing Act (PCHA).38 Before seeking post-conviction relief, Dancer employed
new counsel to appeal his conviction.39 His appeal did not include claims of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel.4 ° After the conviction was affirmed on appeal,
Dancer sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 41 The
petition did not allege the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. 42 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of collateral relief on grounds that
the ineffectiveness claims were waived when new counsel had failed to raise the
claims on direct appeal.43 The court held that the finding of waiver was warranted
by both the PCHA and principles of judgment finality. 4 The court noted that the
PCHA established a rebuttable presumption that failure to raise an issue on appeal
was "knowing and understanding. '45 Under the PCHA, the presumption could be
rebutted only by offering evidence of "extraordinary circumstances" to justify
failure to raise the issue on appeal or to otherwise challenge the effectiveness of
direct appeal counsel. 46 The court noted that ineffectiveness claims could be raised
in a collateral post-conviction proceeding only when (1) the defendant was
represented on appeal by trial counsel, for it was "unrealistic to expect trial counsel
on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness, '47 (2) the defendant has new
counsel on appeal but the bases for the claim of ineffectiveness do not appear in the
trial record, (3) the defendant is able to "prove the existence of other 'extraordinary
circumstances' justifying his failure to raise the issue,"48 or (4) the defendant rebuts
the presumption of "knowing and understanding failure" to raise the issue on direct
appeal.49
In Commonwealth v. Hubbard,50 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed
the rule announced in Dancer that the ineffectiveness of prior counsel must be
raised "at the earliest stage in the proceedings at which the counsel whose
37. 331 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975).
38. Id. at 436; PCHA, 19 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp. 1974) (replaced by the PCRA, 42
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9546 (2006).
39. Dancer, 331 A.2d at 436.
40. Id. at 436.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 438.
45. Dancer, 331 A.2d at 437 (citing 19 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1180-4(c) (Supp. 1974)). The waiver
provision of the PCRA, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9544(b), does not contain the presumption provision.
46. 19 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1180-4(b)(2).
47. Dancer, 331 A.2d at 438.
48. Id.
49. 19 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1180-4(c).
50. 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977), overruled by Grant, 813 A.2d at 726 (Pa. 2002).
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ineffectiveness is being challenged no longer represents the defendant," or the
claim will be deemed waived.5' In Hubbard, the defendant was represented by new
lawyers at both the post-trial stage and on direct appeal. 52 Appellate counsel
alleged the ineffectiveness of both trial and post-trial counsel.5 3  Specifically,
appellate counsel claimed post-trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 54 The court concluded that, because post-trial
counsel had failed to present to the trial court the allegations of trial counsel
ineffectiveness, the claims were waived.55 Trial counsel's performance was
nonetheless reviewed by the court through the lens of post-trial counsel's
ineffectiveness in failing to preserve the claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 56
The court's analysis of the abandoned claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness was
limited to determining whether there was arguable merit to the claims not pursued
by trial counsel and, if so, the basis for post-trial counsel's decision not to raise the
claim. 7 The court noted that, if trial counsel's ineffectiveness was evident on the
face of the record, the appellant would be entitled to file a post-trial motion nunc
pro tunc.5 8 On the other hand, a remand would be required if the record did not
disclose a satisfactory basis for post-trial counsel's omission.59
After Hubbard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court strictly applied the rule that
claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness must be raised at the first opportunity the
defendant was represented by new counsel or the issue was waived. 60 Application
of the rule required that, when ineffectiveness was not raised on direct appeal by
new counsel, post-conviction counsel was required to plead and prove a "layered"
claim of ineffectiveness-namely, that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing
to raise the ineffectiveness of prior counsel. 61 In Commonwealth v. McGill,62 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, when direct appeal did not include claims
of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, or where direct appeal included review of some
claims of ineffectiveness and PCRA counsel raised new claims of trial counsel
ineffectiveness, the only viable claim under the PCRA was one of appellate counsel
ineffectiveness. 63 In order to obtain relief in such a case, the defendant was
required first to satisfy the three-prong standard of ineffectiveness with respect to
51. Id. at 695 n.6.
52. Id. at 695.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 696.
56. Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 696.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 212 (Pa. 2001) (determining that because
appellant's claims of ineffective counsel could have been raised in post-verdict motions or on direct
appeal, those claims were waived), abrogated by Grant, 813 A.2d at 726; Commonwealth v. Hammer,
494 A.2d 1054, 1058 n.2 (Pa. 1985) (citing Hubbard as support for denying review of allegation of
substantial trial error not raised by trial counsel), abrogated by Grant, 813 A.2d. at 726.
61. Grant, 813 A.2d at 733.
62. 832 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 2003).
63. Id. at 1021.
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trial counsel. 61 If successful, the defendant was also required to establish that
appellate counsel did not have a reasonable basis for failing to raise the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel.65 Finally, the defendant had to establish that there
was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal would have been
different had appellate counsel presented the claim of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. 66 The court in McGill acknowledged that its prior decisions had not
clearly set out what a defendant was required to plead and prove in a layered
ineffectiveness claim.67 The court noted that a remand to the PCRA court may be
appropriate where the layered claim had not been properly presented in a manner
sufficient to warrant merits review, provided the defendant had at least pleaded and
presented argument as to the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 68
B. The Grant Decision
Grant was convicted of first-degree murder and was represented on appeal by
new counsel. 69 Following the Superior Court's decision dismissing two of Grant's
claims relating to trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to adequately develop
the claims, 70 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted limited allowance of appeal
and directed the parties to address whether the court should reconsider its decision
in Commonwealth v. Hubbard.71 In the Supreme Court, Grant claimed that the
Superior Court's dismissal of the ineffectiveness claims was erroneous because
procedural rules did not permit an appellant to supplement the record on appeal
with evidence to support the claimed ineffectiveness of trial counsel.72 Grant
argued that, rather than dismissing the claims, the Superior Court should have
64. See Pierce, 527 A.2d at 975 (noting that a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the underlying
claim is of arguable merit, (2) counsel's performance was unreasonable, and (3) counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced the defense). See also Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 649 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa.
1994) (applying the three-part Pierce standard for showing of counsel).
65. McGill, 832 A.2d at 1023.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1020.
68. Id. at 1024. See also Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 A.2d 88, 94 (Pa. 2004) (stating that
petitioner must "present argument on" appellate counsel's ineffectiveness and all prior counsel's
ineffectiveness to preserve a layered claim); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 854 A.2d 465, 468-69 (Pa. 2004)
(stating that only after petitioner has presented argument on appellate counsel's deficient representation
has the petitioner preserved a layered claim of ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Rush, 838 A.2d 651,
656 (Pa. 2003) ("In order to preserve a claim of ineffectiveness, a petitioner must plead ... that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise all prior counsel's ineffectiveness.") (citing McGill,
832 A.2d at 1022) (internal quotation marks omitted); Commonwealth v. Pitts, 884 A.2d 251, 253-54
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (noting that petitioner must assert not only that trial counsel was ineffective in
some material way, but also that appellate counsel was ineffective); Commonwealth v. DuPont, 860
A.2d 525, 531-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) ("[Fior a petitioner to properly raise and prevail on a layered
ineffectiveness claim, sufficient to warrant relief if meritorious, he must plead, present, and prove the
ineffectiveness of Counsel 2 [appellate counsel], which ... necessarily reaches back to the actions of
Counsel 1 [trial counsel].") (citing McGill, 832 A.2d at 1022).
69. Grant, 813 A.2d at 729.
70. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Grant, 761 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (unpublished
decision)).
71. Id. (citing Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687).
72. Id. at 732.
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remanded the claims to the trial court to enable defendant to develop the claims
adequately.7 3 Although neither Grant nor the Commonwealth asked the court to
reconsider its Hubbard decision, the court nonetheless overruled the Hubbard
decision.7 4
The court initially noted that the Hubbard rule, requiring an appellate court to
consider an issue that had not been decided by the trial court, was at odds with
well-established rules that appellate courts do not act as fact finders or consider
matters outside the record or facts not in evidence.75 The Hubbard rule was in fact
the "exact opposite" of the appellate review process followed in other cases. 76 The
court next surveyed how other jurisdictions address claims of ineffectiveness of
counsel, noting that, although a small number of states employ a rule similar to
Hubbard, most jurisdictions, and the majority of the federal courts, require
ineffectiveness claims to be raised in collateral review proceedings.77 A number of
jurisdictions that defer ineffectiveness claims to collateral review recognize that, in
some exceptional cases where the existing record permits review of the
ineffectiveness claim, the ineffectiveness can be addressed on direct appeal.78
Jurisdictions that defer ineffectiveness claims to collateral review do so because, in
most cases, the record is not sufficiently developed to permit the appellate court to
rule on the issue.79 Other jurisdictions are of the view that the trial court is best
situated to make findings about counsel's performance and the impact of acts or
omissions of counsel.80 Finally, in the view of at least one court, appellate counsel
is not charged with the responsibility of finding extra-record claims, such as
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and presenting the claim to the appellate court.8
The rationales offered by other jurisdictions to defer ineffectiveness claims to
collateral review persuaded the court that the Hubbard rule ignored the valid
concerns "that animated [the court's] general approach to appellate review" and
that these concerns should apply equally to claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.82
"Deferring review of trial counsel ineffectiveness claims until the collateral review
stage of the proceedings offers a petitioner the best avenue to effect his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."83  Grant holds that a claim of ineffectiveness of
73. Id.
74. Id. at 738.
75. Grant, 813 A.2d at 732.
76. Id. at 734.
77. Id. After Grant was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, for defendants convicted of
federal crimes, failure to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal did not bar the
claim from being brought in a later federal collateral proceeding. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
500, 504 (2003).
78. Grant, 813 A.2d at 734-35.
79. Id. at 736.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1221-22 (Ind. 1998)).
82. Id. at 737.
83. Id. at 738. For many indigent defendants, deferring consideration of ineffectiveness claims to
the post-conviction stage does not offer the "best avenue to effect" their right to effective counsel. In
contrast to direct appeal, where the defendant is obligated only to communicate to counsel his wish to
appeal, in order for claims to be reviewed in a post-conviction proceeding, an indigent defendant must
file a timely pro se petition for relief. Unlike direct appeal, under the PCRA, a petition must be filed
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counsel will not be considered waived because new counsel on direct appeal did
not present the claim of prior counsel's ineffectiveness. 84 Instead, as a general
rule,85 claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel will not be considered on direct
appeal, but rather will be deferred to collateral review. 86
C. Post-Grant Case Law
1. Ineffectiveness Claims Raised by Post-Sentence Motion
In Commonwealth v. Bomar,87 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
Grant did not apply when a defendant's claims of ineffectiveness were properly
raised and preserved in the trial court.88 In Bomar, trial counsel withdrew
following sentencing and new counsel filed post-sentence motions including claims
of trial counsel ineffectiveness.89 The trial court conducted hearings on the motions
that included the testimony of trial counsel and addressed the ineffectiveness claims
in its opinion. The Supreme Court held that the concerns that led it to adopt the
rule in Grant did not apply and, therefore, the ineffectiveness claims were
reviewable on direct appeal.90
In Commonwealth v. May,91 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that
the Bomar exception did not apply where a claim of ineffectiveness was raised for
the first time in the defendant's Rule 1925(b) statement92 and addressed by the trial
court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 93 The court noted that the claim was "not raised
when the matter was within the jurisdiction of the trial court and, as a consequence,
before a court is authorized to appoint counsel. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(a). A defendant's failure to
file a timely petition will result in waiver of the ineffectiveness claims. Post-conviction claims have
been waived as the result of an untimely petition because defendant's housing status in prison limited his
ability to gain access to legal materials, Commonwealth v. Barrett, 761 A.2d 145, 146-48 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000), and where the defendant, because of mental illness, was unable to file a timely petition and
thereby trigger the appointment of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700, 704 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) ("[W]e hold that Appellant's petition was properly dismissed as untimely under the
PCRA statute and his claim of continuing mental illness does not constitute an exception to its
jurisdictional time requirements.").
84. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
85. The court noted a possible exception to the general rule when the ineffectiveness claim involves
"a complete or constructive denial of counsel" or when counsel breaches his or her duty of loyalty. Id.
at 738 n.14.
86. See id. at 739 (Saylor, J., concurring) (noting that the Hubbard decision allows for a remand by
the appellate court to allow the trial court to consider an ineffectiveness claim raised for first time on
direct appeal). On the other hand, Justice Saylor also argued that the new rule in Grant should not apply
when the claim of ineffectiveness has been duly developed in the trial court by a post-sentence motion.
Id. at 740.
87. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
88. Id. at 855.
89. Id. at 839. It is also worth noting that the ineffectiveness claims in Bomar were presented to the
trial court in 1999, prior to Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Grant. Id.
90. Id. at 855.
91. 887 A.2d 750 (Pa. 2005).
92. PA. R. App. P. 1925(b) (stating that the trial court may require an appellant to file and serve on
the trial judge a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal).
93. May, 887 A.2d at 758.
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the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified."9 4 As
an additional basis for deferring review to the post-conviction process, the court
observed that there was no reason to believe that the defendant's Rule 1925(b)
statement exhausted all record or non-record based claims of ineffectiveness. 95
Considering the Rule 1925(b) claims on appeal, the court noted, would involve
piecemeal review96 and would require PCRA counsel to plead and prove a layered
claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. 97
2. Sentences of Short Duration
Following Grant, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized a "short
sentence" exception to the Grant rule. 98 The exception was originally set out in
Commonwealth v. Salisbury,99 where the defendant was sentenced to ninety days
imprisonment and the court stayed the sentence pending direct appeal. 1°u On
appeal, the defendant alleged that trial counsel was ineffective.' 0' The Superior
Court reviewed the claim of ineffectiveness relying upon language in Grant that the
rule did not apply if it would result in harm to one of the parties to the appeal.'
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. In Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 764-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), the Superior
Court approved a form of piecemeal review when it declined to consider a claim that guilty plea counsel
was ineffective in not ensuring that defendant was fully aware of the elements of the crime because the
claim had not been developed at a hearing in the trial court. Id. As to a second claim of ineffectiveness
that the guilty plea was improperly induced by counsel's false representation that defendant would
receive a lesser sentence than imposed, the court applied the Bomar exception because the claim had
been presented to the trial court and fully developed at an evidentiary hearing. Id.
97. May, 887 A.2d at 758. Bomar was also distinguished in Commonwealth v. Belak, 825 A.2d
1252, 1255 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (noting absence of evidentiary record and trial court opinion on claims where
ineffectiveness claim not raised until defendant filed Rule 1925(b) statement), but Bomar was followed
in Commonwealth v. Bohonyi, 900 A.2d 877, 883 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (noting that the adequacy of
trial counsel's representation was properly before the Superior Court where the trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified) and Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 540
(Pa. 2005) (noting that it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to review ineffectiveness claims
because new counsel filed amended post-sentence motion alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel and
trial court held evidentiary hearing and issued opinion with respect to the claim). See also
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 827 A.2d 1195, 1199 n.8 (Pa. 2003) (noting that the Bomar exception was
inapplicable because appellant did not raise ineffectiveness claims before trial court and trial court thus
did not address them); Fowler, 893 A.2d at 764-65 (finding that the Bomar exception did not apply to
the first claim because it had not been developed at a hearing in the trial court, but applying the Bomar
exception to the second claim because it had been presented to trial court and fully developed at
evidentiary hearing); Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 795-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (denying
ineffectiveness of counsel claim where trial court record lacked support for any conclusion of a manifest
injustice); Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 175 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (noting that a complete
trial court record and opinion is sufficient to dismiss claim of ineffective counsel).
98. See Salisbury, 823 A.2d at 916 (addressing appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because he was sentenced to only ninety days imprisonment and thus would be precluded from raising
that claim in a collateral petition).
99. 823 A.2d 914.
100. Id. at 916 n.l.
101. Id. at 915.
102. Id. at 916. The reference to harm in Grant was in the context of the court's decision to apply the
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Noting that to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant must be in custody and that
there is no provision for stay of sentence pending PCRA review, the court
concluded that the defendant would be harmed by the Grant rule because the
defendant's short sentence would preclude collateral review of the claim of
ineffectiveness.0 3 The court stated that, in light of the defendant's sentence,
"review delayed constitutes review denied." 1°4 The Superior Court followed the
"short sentence" exception in Salisbury in Commonwealth v. Ingold,05 where the
defendant was sentenced to seven days time-served, and in Commonwealth v.
Viglione, °6 where the defendant was ordered to pay a fine.
In Commonwealth v. O'Berg,107 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the
"short sentence" exception to Grant. O'Berg was convicted of misdemeanor and
summary offenses and sentenced to thirty days to twenty-three-and-a-half months
in prison. 0 The trial court permitted him to remain free on bail until his appeal
was final, but O'Berg chose to begin serving his sentence while his case was
pending in the Superior Court.3 9
O'Berg's appeal challenged the effectiveness of trial counsel." 0 After his
brief had been filed in the Superior Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Commonwealth v. Grant."' Relying on the new precedent
established by Grant, the Superior Court dismissed O'Berg's ineffectiveness claim
without prejudice to O'Berg raising the issue in a PCRA proceeding."12 No longer
in custody, O'Berg sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, seeking an
exception to Grant when PCRA review is not available because the defendant is no
longer in custody. 13 O'Berg argued that the Superior Court's decision to dismiss
new rule retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal where the issue of ineffectiveness had been
properly raised and preserved. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738. The court was persuaded that retroactive
application of the new rule would harm neither party because claims of ineffectiveness can be raised in a
collateral proceeding. Id. at 739.
103. Salisbury, 823 A.2d at 916 n.l.
104. Id.
105. 823 A.2d 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). See also Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 588 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003) (addressing ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal where defendant was sentenced to
immediate term of probation concurrent with sentence on unrelated offense and term had expired);
Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728, 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (reviewing ineffectiveness claim
where defendant was sentenced to ninety days). The Superior Court distinguished Salisbury and Ingold
in Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (concluding that defendant's
sentence of ninety days imprisonment and a concurrent term of three years probation did not preclude
him from presenting ineffectiveness claim in a PCRA petition) and Blessitt, 852 A.2d at 1220 (finding
that prison term of sixteen to thirty-two months sufficient time within which to pursue ineffectiveness
claims under the PCRA).
106. 842 A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). In Viglione, the court concluded that, given the nature of
the ineffectiveness claim, namely counsel's failure to raise a claim of double jeopardy, the court was not
without a record, and it was not required to go outside the record to rule on the ineffectiveness claim.
Id. at 459-460.
107. 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 599.
112. Id.
113. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 599.
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his ineffectiveness claim pursuant to Grant placed him in the unfair position of
losing his opportunity to litigate his ineffectiveness claim and that such a result
conflicted with the intent of Grant, which was to offer "a petitioner the best avenue
to effect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." '"1 4
In refusing to recognize a "short sentence" exception to Grant, the court noted
that central to its rejection of Hubbard and its adoption of the rule in Grant was the
absence of review of the ineffectiveness claim by the trial court, placing the
appellate court in the role of fact finder." 5 Acknowledging that a defendant should
not be harmed by the Grant rule, the court nonetheless concluded that a "short
sentence" exception would undermine the rationale of the general rule announced
in Grant."6  In addition, the court held that the proposed exception was too
ambiguous to give the lower courts any guidance on what is a sufficiently "short
sentence" in order for the exception to apply."I7
Although the prosecution claimed in O'Berg that the "short sentence"
exception was not necessary because the Bomar exception allows defendants with
short sentences an opportunity to obtain review of ineffectiveness claims by means
of a post-sentence motion, Justice Castille, in his concurring opinion in O'Berg,
rejected such an approach." 8  Noting that ineffectiveness claims are
"quintessentially collateral claims" expressly cognizable under the PCRA, Justice
Castille stated that the court should not "subvert the PCRA" by allowing for "pre-
litigation" of ineffectiveness claims by post-verdict motions in cases where
defendants cannot pursue PCRA relief because they are not in custody.'19
In light of the now-settled PCRA construct, I do not believe that this
Court is remotely obliged to permit any criminal defendant-no
sentence, short sentence, long sentence, capital sentence-to raise
collateral claims, such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as a
matter of right upop post-trial motions.... The appropriate forum
for litigating claims of ineffectiveness is under the PCRA. That
"short sentence" detendants may not be able to pursue such claims is
an appropriate consequence of a legislative choice .... Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, as a class, are no more important than
other substantive constitutional claims deemed cognizable under the
PCRA, such that they must be afforded an ad hoc, judicially-created,
extra-PCRA forum. 120
114. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
115. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 600.
116. Id. at 601-02.
117. Id. at 602.
118. Id. at 602-03 (Castille, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 604.
120. Id. at 605. Justice Castille recommended referral of the issue to the Criminal Procedural Rules
Committee, but expressed concern that post-verdict process not be transformed into a new "round of
collateral attack as of fight," noting that reconsideration of post-trial practice must take into account the
fact that the PCRA "explicitly envisions a single collateral challenge." Id. at 606.
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Justice Saylor's dissenting opinion supported the Superior Court's effort to
implement fundamental fairness by allowing a "short sentence" exception to
Grant.'2' Justice Saylor noted that Hubbard allows for a remand to the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing of ineffectiveness claims raised for the first time on
direct appeal.'22 Justice Saylor stated that not allowing the Superior Court to
determine which sentences qualify for the exception is to "curtail unduly the
availability of appellate review," impinging upon the right to direct appeal
guaranteed by article V, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 123
III. REVIEWING INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS IN CASES
WHERE A SHORT SENTENCE IS IMPOSED
Grant and O'Berg require that claims of ineffectiveness raised on direct
appeal for the first time be deferred to the post-conviction process regardless of the
sentence imposed.124 To be eligible for post-conviction relief, a defendant must be
in custody both at the time a post-conviction petition is filed and at the time relief is
granted.125 As a result, a defendant who receives a short sentence of imprisonment
that has been stayed pending direct appeal but serves the sentence before post-
conviction review is completed is without a remedy "to vindicate [his] fight to
effective trial counsel."'126 Even if the defendant waives other alleged trial errors
and immediately seeks post-conviction relief after sentence is imposed, 127 if the
sentence is served before the post-conviction process is completed, relief cannot be
ordered. Clearly, for defendants with short sentences, deferring the ineffectiveness
claim until the post-conviction stage is not, in the language of Grant, "the best
avenue to effect [a defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel."' 128 Moreover,
it conflicts with the specific language of the PCRA and the legislature's intent not
"to limit the availability of remedies . .. on direct appeal from the judgment of
sentence ...."129 Finally, as noted by Justice Saylor in his dissent in O'Berg, the
present practice of denying defendants with short sentences appellate review of
claims of ineffectiveness when post-conviction review is unavailable constitutes an
unreasonable restriction on a defendant's right to appeal guaranteed by article V,
121. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 606 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 607. See also Commonwealth v. Musi, 404 A.2d 378, 380 n.4 (Pa. 1979) ("Where one
seeks to raise a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal and an enhanced record is required to
support the claim, the proper procedure is to request a remand for an evidentiary hearing.").
123. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 607 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
124. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738; O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 598.
125. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.
126. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 378.
127. If new counsel is appointed for direct appeal where the defendant has received a short sentence,
new counsel has an obligation to discuss with the defendant withdrawing the appeal and pursuing post-
conviction relief when counsel believes that the undeveloped ineffectiveness claim is stronger than
issues preserved for appeal and new counsel believes that the sentence will not be served before the
post-conviction process is completed. If the direct appeal is withdrawn, the preserved issues are waived.
128. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
129. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542. But see PA. R. CRIM. P. 901 cmt. ("By statute, a court may not
entertain a request for any form of relief in anticipation of the filing of a petition for post-conviction
collateral relief.").
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section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.130 An amendment to the PCRA, or
modest changes to the current post-sentence procedure, would provide defendants
with short sentences a forum to assert the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
A. Amend the Post Conviction Relief Act by Providing for Stay of Sentence
The simplest way to address the Grant/O'Berg problem is an amendment to
the PCRA that grants the PCRA court discretion to stay the defendant's sentence by
continuing the defendant on bail if the court concludes that the defendant's
sentence would be served before post-conviction review was completed.' Such an
amendment would provide defendants with short sentences with the opportunity for
post-conviction review of claims of ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate
counsel.
As noted, to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a defendant must be
"currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for the
crime."' 32 Physical custody was not always required in Pennsylvania in order to
seek post-conviction relief. Under the PCHA, 33 the predecessor to the PCRA,
post-conviction review was available to persons who had completed their sentences
but had suffered a collateral consequence of the conviction. 3 4 In 1997, the General
Assembly amended section 9542 by adding the language that the Act does not
"provide relief from the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction."' 35 Also
130. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 607 (Saylor, J., dissenting). See Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 416 A.2d
477, 479 (Pa. 1980) (describing the right to appeal under the Pennsylvania Constitution as "absolute").
In post-Wilkerson cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that rights under the Pennsylvania
Constitution "are not absolute" but subject to reasonable legislative restrictions. See Commonwealth v.
Morris, 771 A.2d 721, 732 (Pa. 2001) (reasoning that, because "the legislature may put reasonable
restrictions on constitutional rights," the Court does not have to grant a stay of execution so that the
petitioner may have a meaningful appellate review); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa.
1998) (refusing to grant an extension to the one-year filing requirement to the PCRA, even though
restricting petitioner's access may have been unconstitutional, because "[ilt is axiomatic that no
constitutional rights are absolute"). Even if the "reasonable restriction" rule applies to court decisions
that restrict a state constitutional right, Grant imposes an unreasonable restriction on the right of appeal
because it leaves a "short sentence" defendant without a remedy to "effect his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." Grant, 813 A.2d at 737.
131. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 761 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (unpublished decision).
132. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
133. 19 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1180-1 to 1180-14.
134. Id. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Doria, 364 A.2d 322, 323-24 (Pa. 1976) (extending the
holding in Sheehan to cover civil matters as well), superseded by statute, PCRA, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9543, as recognized in Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 718 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465,
469 (Pa. 1971) (finding that attack on a satisfied sentence is proper when it would directly affect a
subsequent criminal conviction or prosecution), superseded by statute, PCRA, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9543, as recognized in Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718. Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
custody is not a pre-condition to seeking relief under the Act. UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE
ACT, 11 U.L.A. 201 cmt. to §§ 1 and 3(b) (2003). The growing body of legal consequences from a
criminal conviction has prompted the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
begin drafting a Uniform Act on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction. Margaret Love,
Uniform Law Commissioners Drafting Collateral Consequences Act, A.B.A CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWSL.
Wash., D.C., (Spring 2007), at 4, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ newsletterspring2007.pdf.
135. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542. Prior to the amendments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that, because the PCRA supersedes common law remedies, collateral consequences alone did not entitle
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in 1997, the General Assembly amended section 9543(a) to limit the Act to
defendants who are in custody "at the time relief is granted.' 3 6 These changes to
the Act were made prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Grant to defer
ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction process.'37
Adding a discretionary stay provision to the PCRA does not alter the basic
framework of the remedy. Rather, because Grant limits direct appeal, allowing the
PCRA court to stay the sentence by continuing the defendant on bail simply
extends to the post-conviction process the existing stay of sentence procedures that
were available to short sentence defendants when ineffectiveness claims were
reviewable on direct appeal. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462(G)(2)
permits a stay of sentence pending direct appeal for defendants convicted of
summary offenses following a trial de novo. 13 8 Likewise, Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 521(B) grants defendants with short sentences the same right to
bail pending appeal as before conviction unless modified by the court. 139 Finally, a
stay provision is not inconsistent with the requirement that a defendant be in
custody in order to obtain post-conviction relief. The United States Supreme Court
has held that a person released on his own recognizance following sentencing in
state court was "in custody"' 40 within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus
statute. 141 The defendant was in custody, the Court concluded, because he was
subject to restraints under state law "not shared by the public generally"'142 that
placed his freedom of movement "in the hands of state judicial officers.' 143
Likewise, short sentence defendants in Pennsylvania whose sentences have been
stayed pending appeal are subject to conditions that impose significant restrictions
on their freedom of movement not shared by the public, including reporting
requirements and travel restrictions.' 44 Failure to comply with the conditions of
release subjects the defendant to arrest. 14  A discretionary, post-conviction stay
would provide defendants with short sentences the sage opportunity to challenge
a defendant to relief under the Act. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 721. 'See also Pierce, 579 A.2d at 966
(concluding that the PCRA did not authorize "relief for those whose sentences had expired, regardless of
the collateral consequences").
136. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1). See Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720 (Pa. 1997) (finding that the
plain language of the statute "clearly contemplates that the petitioner will be serving a sentence at both
the pleading and proof stages of the proceeding").
137. In contrast to the PCRA, the "in custody" requirement in the federal habeas corpus statute is
satisfied if the petitioner was in custody at the time the petition was filed. Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U.S.
234, 238 (1968) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006)). A subsequent release from custody while a petition
challenging a criminal conviction is pending does not divest the court of jurisdiction. See Spencer v.
Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (finding petitioner's petition for relief moot because it no longer satisfied
the "case or controversy requirement," not because he was no longer in custody); Carafas, 391 U.S. at
239 (allowing petitioner, who had been in custody at the time he filed his application, relief even though
he was released from custody two weeks before filing for certiorari).
138. PA. R. CRiM. P. 462(G)(2).
139. PA. R. CRIM. P. 521(B).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
141. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
142. Id. (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
143. Id.
144. PA. R. CRitm. P. 527(A)(1)-(3).
145. PA. R. CRim. P. 536(A)(1)(b).
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ineffectiveness of prior counsel that is available to defendants who receive longer
sentences.
B. Proposed Changes in Post-Sentence Procedure
In the absence of a stay provision that would allow defendants who receive
short sentences to raise ineffectiveness of counsel claims in a post-conviction
proceeding, fairness requires that a procedure be established post-sentence to
permit the trial court to consider a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Such a
procedure would result in a record and opinion reviewable by an appellate court,
thereby addressing the concerns that led the court to adopt the deferral rule in Grant
and to reject the "short sentence" exception in O'Berg. Because the rules of
criminal procedure already provide defendants with the option to file a post-
sentence motion for a new trial, 146 only minimal changes need to be made to the
rule governing appointment of counsel and to post-sentence motion procedure to
provide short sentence defendants a forum to litigate their constitutional right to
effective counsel.
1. Amend Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 122
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 122 provides that, when counsel is
appointed in both summary and court cases, the appointment is "effective until final
judgment, including any proceedings upon direct appeal."' 147  Because "it is
unrealistic to expect trial counsel... to argue his own ineffectiveness,"1 48 Rule 122
should be amended to provide the trial court with the discretion to appoint new
counsel for an indigent defendant when a sentence of short duration is imposed.
The appointment of new counsel should occur in any case where the trial court
imposes a minimum sentence that the court, in its discretion, concludes may be
served before post-conviction review is completed. 49 In essence, new counsel here
plays the role of counsel that would have been appointed15 ° had defendant remainedI..
in custody and sought post-conviction relief following direct appeal. Only new
counsel can advise the defendant as to whether there is a basis for claiming
ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 5' If so, a post-sentence motion preserves the issue
146. PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(B)(1)(a)(iv).
147. PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(B)(2).
148. Dancer, 331 A.2d 435, 438 (Pa. 1975), abrogated by Grant, 813 A.2d at 726. See also
Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 866 A.2d 292, 299 n.9 (Pa. 2005) ("Under Pennsylvania law, trial counsel
cannot be expected to raise his own ineffectiveness on direct appeal."); Commonwealth v. Green, 709
A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1998) (noting that a public defender may not argue the ineffectiveness of another
member of the same public defender's office because appellate counsel would then essentially be
asserting a claim of his or her own ineffectiveness).
149. See Donald J. Harris, Kim Nieves & Thomas M. Place, Dispatch and Delay: Post-Conviction
Relief Act Litigation in Non-Capital Cases, 41 DuQ. L. REv. 467, 488 (2003) (noting that, in the
author's 2003 study, the median time statewide for a non-capital PCRA petition to be decided was ten
months).
150. PA. R. CRIM. P. 904(C) (providing for appointment of counsel as a matter of right following
filing of a first petition for post-conviction relief).
151. See Dancer, 331 A.2d at 438 ("[I]t is unrealistic to expect trial counsel on direct appeal to argue
his own ineffectiveness .... ").
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for appeal and will result in a record and opinion by the trial court that will be
available to the appellate court as required by the court in Bomar.52 Once new
counsel is appointed, a claim of ineffectiveness should not be considered waived if
the defendant decides that his sentence affords him sufficient time to pursue post-
conviction relief in lieu of filing a post-sentence motion. Moving the claim directly
to collateral review is consistent with the court's view in Grant that, as a general
rule, ineffectiveness claims should be resolved in the post-conviction process and
that waiver will occur only after a petitioner has had the opportunity to raise the
claim on collateral review and has failed to avail himself of that opportunity. 5 3 If
new counsel determines that there is no basis to assert a claim of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel, and the defendant requests an appeal on other grounds, new counsel
would represent the defendant on direct appeal.
2. Amend Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 72014
With the exception of after-discovered evidence, Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 720, which gives defendants the option to file a post-sentence
motion, requires that the motion be filed no more than ten days after imposition of
sentence.'55 In addition, the Rule provides that there shall be no post-sentence
motion in summary case appeals following trial de novo in the court of common
pleas.' 56 Both provisions of the Rule should be amended in light of Grant and
0 'Berg.
If new counsel is appointed by the trial court post-sentence to give the
defendant an opportunity to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the ten day
limit in the Rule should be enlarged to provide new counsel sufficient time to
become familiar with the case, including reviewing the trial transcript to determine
whether trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel.
The Rule should also be amended to provide for a post-sentence motion
raising the ineffectiveness of trial counsel in summary case appeals. Indigent
defendants in summary cases have a rule-based right to counsel if there is a
likelihood that imprisonment will be imposed'57 and they also, like defendants in
court cases, have a right to direct appeal. In light of Grant, in order for an appeal to
152. 826 A.2d at 854. In a post-Grant case, Commonwealth v. Hudson, 820 A.2d 720 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003), a panel of the Superior Court concluded it could address the merits of an ineffectiveness claim
when the claim was properly raised by new counsel in a timely post-sentence motion which was heard
and decided by the trial court. Id. at 726.
153. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738 (concluding that a decision to seek immediate post-conviction review
would waive all claims that could have been reviewed on direct appeal).
154. In 2005, prior to O'Berg, the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee reconsidered amendments
to Rule 720 that were proposed following the Grant decision. Based on comments the Committee
received, and reconsideration of the issue, the Committee concluded that the bench and bar would be
better served if the text of Rule 720 was not amended to address the ineffective assistance of counsel
issue. CRIM. PROCEDURAL RULES CoMM., FINAL REPORT: AMENDMENTS TO PA. R. CRIM. P. 720
(2005).
155. PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(A)(1).
156. PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(D).
157. PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(A)(1).
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be meaningful, a defendant in a summary case appeal must be provided a forum in
the trial court to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel.
CONCLUSION
As the result of Grant and O'Berg, defendants who receive short sentences do
not have a forum to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel, even though every
defendant, regardless of the length of the sentence imposed, has a federal and state
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.'58 If the right to counsel is
meaningless if effective assistance is not guaranteed, 15 9 effective counsel is equally
meaningless if the state provides no procedure to enforce the right. This principle
was the basis for decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granting defendants
collateral review of ineffectiveness claims in discretionary appeal and post-
conviction proceedings when the right to counsel was not constitutionally
guaranteed but based instead upon a rule of criminal procedure. It follows that,
where the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, a forum must be available
for defendants without regard to the length of the sentence imposed to protect their
right to effective counsel. "[T]he constitution does not afford some lesser right to
effective counsel on those charged with non-capital crimes. The right to counsel
inures to the . . .felon and the misdemeanant alike."' 160 Waiving direct appeal of
preserved issues in favor of filing a PCRA petition is not a choice if the defendant's
sentence will be served before the PCRA court rules on the ineffectiveness claim.
Moreover, denying direct review of ineffectiveness claims when there is no other
forum for the defendant to raise the issue deprives short sentence defendants of
their state constitutional right to direct appeal.
One solution is for the legislature to amend the PCRA to grant the PCRA
court the discretion to stay the sentence imposed following the filing of a post-
conviction petition if the court concludes that the sentence will be served by the
time the PRCA process is completed. A stay of sentence would permit collateral
review of claims of ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate counsel. Absent an
amendment authorizing a discretionary stay of sentence, post-sentence motion
procedure should be amended to provide defendants who will not be eligible for
collateral review a means to vindicate their right to effective trial counsel. For
indigent defendants, a post-sentence remedy in lieu of collateral review begins with
the court appointing new counsel following sentencing. Defendants with retained
counsel should be advised by the trial court that, unless the issue of ineffectiveness
is presented by way of a post-sentence motion, there will be no review of the claim
if the sentence imposed is served before post-conviction review is completed. Post-
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (citing the federal constitutional right to assistance of counsel in a
criminal case); PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (citing a state constitutional right to assistance of counsel in a
criminal case); O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 598 (declining to impose a "short sentence" exception to the general
rule that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be deferred until the collateral review
proceedings); Grant, 813 A.2d at 738 ("[As] a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.").
159. Albert, 561 A.2d at 738.
160. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 255 (Pa. 2003) (Eakin, J., concurring).
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sentence motion procedure should be amended to allow new counsel adequate time
to investigate and fully develop a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Either
approach addresses the unfairness of deferring ineffectiveness claims to the post-
conviction process, where post-conviction relief for ineffectiveness of trial counsel
will not be available to the more than fifteen percent of defendants sentenced each
year in Pennsylvania to less than a year of imprisonment.
